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Contagion Effects of the Global 
Financial Crisis in US and 
European Real Economy Sectors 
 
Summary: This paper empirically investigates the contagion effects of the
Global Financial Crisis (2007-2009) from the financial sector to the real econo-
my by examining nine sectors of US and developed European region. We 
provide a regional analysis by testing stock market contagion on the aggregate
level and the sector level, on the global level and the domestic/regional level.
Results show evidence of global contagion in US and developed European 
aggregate stock market indices and all US sector indices, implying the limited
benefits of portfolio diversification. On the other hand, most of the European
regional sectors seem to be immune to the adverse effects of the crisis. Finally,
all non-financial sectors of both geographical areas seem to be unaffected by
their domestic financial systems. These findings have important implications for
policy makers, investors and international organizations.
Key words: Global financial crisis, Financial contagion, Real economy sectors, 
USA, Europe. 
JEL: G15, F30.
 
 
 
 
On 9
th August 2007 the large French bank BNP Paribas temporarily halted redemp-
tions for three of its funds that held assets backed by US subprime mortgage debt. 
Since then, many unanticipated and tumultuous economic events, as well as their 
global scale and magnitude, contributed to characterize the US subprime as the be-
ginning of a “Global Financial Crisis” (GFC, hereafter). The GFC of 2007-2009 af-
fected both financial activities and macroeconomic conditions around the globe that 
are difficult to be explained by pointing to “fundamentals”. “Contagion” became the 
catchword for such phenomena and is now widely being used to describe the spread 
of financial disturbances from one country to others. The literature on financial con-
tagion literally exploded since the thought-provoking paper by Kristin J. Forbes and 
Roberto Rigobon (2002) started circulating in the late 1990s. They define contagion 
as “a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to one country (or 
group of countries)”, otherwise, a continued market correlation at high levels is con-
sidered to be “no contagion, only interdependence”.  
There is a large body of literature on financial contagion during several crises 
occurred within the last three decades (see Dimitris Kenourgios, Aristeidis Samitas, 
and Nikos Paltalidis 2011; Dimitrios Dimitriou, Kenourgios, and Theodore Simos 
2013; Kuan-Min Wang and Hung-Cheng Lai 2013, for a survey). This literature has 
focused mainly on contagion effects across stock markets in different countries, 
based on aggregate data. This paper empirically investigates the contagion effects of  
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the GFC, using non-aggregate data and focuses on the transmission of shocks from 
financial sector stock indices to nine non-financial sector stock indices, and thus the 
“real economy” of two major geographical areas, namely US and developed Europe.  
Prior works that analyze non-aggregate stock market indices of different coun-
tries are still rare (see the following section for a literature review). Our study ex-
tends the existing literature and provides an analysis of the relationship among finan-
cial contagion and the real economy at a regional level rather than individual country 
level, since no attention has been paid to the dynamics of contagion from a regional 
perspective. The analysis of stock prices grouped into regional sector indices will 
shed light on the impact of the global crisis on the real economy of regions, since 
regional sector indices are indicators of the economic activities of a region. We select 
sectors of the US and developed European region due to the significant impact of 
these economies on the rest of the world. Together they account for over 25% of 
world domestic product. Furthermore, the US-developed Europe bilateral economic 
relationship can influence the economic conditions in other countries. Therefore, this 
is an interesting pair to examine the existence of financial contagion by testing vari-
ous channels, that is: (i) contagion of aggregate equity market indices; (ii) contagion 
of the financial sector across US and developed European region; (iii) contagion of 
the financial sector and the real economy across US and developed Europe; (iv) con-
tagion of the financial sector and the real economy within US and developed Europe. 
The empirical results can be summarized as follows. The GFC can be characterized 
by: (a) contagion of aggregate US and developed European equity indices; (b) conta-
gion of financial sector only for US, while the developed Europe show evidence of 
immunity; (c) contagion of US real economy sectors, while most of the sectors in 
developed European region seem to be unaffected from the GFC. Finally, all non-
financial sectors of US and developed European region seem to be unaffected by 
their domestic financial systems.  
Many interesting aspects emerged from our empirical analysis. Firstly, the US 
stock market and real economy sectors are severely affected by the crisis. Due to the 
fact that the US is the source of the GFC, many investors may consider that the bad 
news concern only the US and so the other markets would be safer. On the other 
hand, most of the sectors of developed European region seem to be immune to the 
adverse effects of the crisis. This implies that markets with great exposure via trade 
or financial linkages were not necessarily hit hardest by the crisis, mainly due to their 
fundamental strengths and quality of institutions. These results are useful for inves-
tors in order to diversify their assets and reduce the costs of future financial crises. 
Also, an assessment of the breadth of a financial crisis can also assist US and Euro-
pean policy makers in effectively designing stimulus packages to reduce the possibil-
ity of a future infection of multiple sectors.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 reviews the prior lite-
rature. Section 2 introduces the methodology framework to test contagion, the crisis 
period identification, the channels of contagion and the hypotheses to be tested. Sec-
tion 3 presents the dataset and preliminary analysis. Section 4 produces the estima-
tion results and robustness tests. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the findings and con-
cludes.  
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1. Literature Review 
 
The existing literature that analyzes contagion during several crises using aggregate 
stock market indices is vast. The Asian crisis contagion clearly receives the highest 
share of attention in the literature (see for example Reuven Glick and Andrew K. 
Rose 1999; Forbes and Rigobon 2002; Geert Bekaert, Campbell R. Harvey, and   
Angela Ng 2005; Brian H. Boyer, Timoni Kumagai, and Kathy Yuan 2006; Thomas 
Chiang, Bang N. Jeon, and Huimin Li 2007; Essahbi Essaadi, Jamel Jouini, and   
Wajih Khallouli 2009; Mardi Dungey, George Milunovich, and Susan Thorp 2010; 
Kenourgios, Samitas, and Paltalidis 2011; Kenourgios, Dimitrios Asteriou, and   
Samitas 2013). On the other hand, there is limited empirical evidence on the conta-
gious effects of the Russian default in 1998 (Gaston R. Gelos and Ratna Sahay 2001; 
Dungey et al. 2007) and the Argentinean crisis of 1999-2001 (Melisso Boschi 2005; 
Kenourgios and Puja Padhi 2012) in global financial markets. 
Recently, a large number of studies provide evidence on contagion of the US 
subprime crisis and the GFC in advanced and emerging stock markets (Riadh Aloui, 
Mohamed S. Ben Aïssa, and Duc Khuong Nguyen 2011; Lalith P. Samarakoon 2011; 
Manolis N. Syllignakis and Georgios P. Kouretas 2011; Kenourgios and Padhi 2012; 
Dimitriou, Kenourgios, and Simos 2013; Dimitriou and Simos 2013). Another strand 
of the literature confirms contagion of the GFC on credit default swap (CDS) mar-
kets (Michael Dooley and Michael Hutchison 2009; Ping Wang and Tomoe Moore 
2012), bond markets (Francis A. Longstaff 2010) and other asset classes, such as 
exchange rates, real estate, commodities and energy (Kam Fong Chan et al. 2011; 
Feng Guo, Carl R. Chen, and Ying Sophie Huang 2011; John Beirne and Jana Gieck 
2012). On the other hand, the investigation of the effects of the EMU sovereign-debt 
crisis on stock markets (Samitas and Ioannis Tsakalos 2013), bond markets (Michael 
G. Arghyrou and Alexandros Kontonikas 2012; Silvo Dajcman 2013; Dionisis Phi-
lippas and Costas Siriopoulos 2013) and CDS markets (Alesia Kalbaska and Mateusz 
Gatkowski 2012; Beirne and Marcel Fratzscher 2013) is growing fast. 
However, few of the existing studies investigate the contagion effects of the 
GFC based on non-aggregate data. A recent example of this literature is Dirk G. 
Baur’s (2012) study that examines the transmission of shocks from the financial sec-
tor to real economy sectors in 25 major developed and emerging stock markets. His 
results demonstrate that no country and sector was immune to the adverse effects of 
the crisis limiting the effectiveness of portfolio diversification. However, he provides 
clear evidence that some sectors in particular Healthcare, Telecommunications and 
Technology were less severely affected by the crisis.  
Another example is the work of Bekaert et al. (2011) that analyzes the equity 
market transmission of the 2007-2009 GFC to country-industry equity portfolios in 
55 countries. They find evidence of contagion from US markets and from the global 
financial sector, but the effects are economically small. On the other hand, there has 
been substantial contagion from domestic equity markets to individual domestic eq-
uity portfolios, while its severity inversely related to the quality of fundamentals and 
policies of each country. They also confirm that investors focus substantially more 
on country-specific characteristics during a crisis. Paulo Horta, Carlos Mendes, and 
Isabel Vieira (2010) analyze four European aggregate stock markets, financial sector  
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and industrial sector during the GFC and find contagion for all markets and sectors. 
Finally, Kate Phylaktis and Lichuan Xia (2004) investigate portfolio diversification 
among various real economy sectors within a CAPM perspective during the period 
from 1990 until 2004 and provide mixed evidence for contagion.  
 
2. Methodology Framework 
 
According to a market model proposed by Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2005), conta-
gion from one market to another is estimated as follows: 
 
,, , ,, market i t world t market i t ra b r e    (1)
 
** ,, 0 1 2 , ,, market i t crisis i t market t market t ec c e c e D       (2)
 
where rmarket,i is the return stock index of market i, rworld,i is the return of a global eq-
uity portfolio, and emarket is the estimated residuals from the first equation. A second-
pass regression utilizes emarket from Equation (1) to determine the impact of unex-
pected shocks from the crisis-market (emarket*) on the unexpected return component 
(emarket,i) in market i. The dummy variable Dcrisis is equal to unity if there is a crisis 
and zero otherwise. The parameter c1 is an indicator of interdependence and the pa-
rameter c2 measures the contagion effects. Contagion exists if c2 is positive and sta-
tistically significant. 
However, the above specification is sensitive to the specification of the first-
pass regression. Moreover, controlling the Equation (1) by adding financial and ma-
croeconomic variables that may change during the crisis period can lead to an esti-
mate of “unexpected” shocks which is not truly unexpected. Specifically, if the first-
pass regression employs regressors that contain unexpected information the suppo-
sedly unexpected component in the second-pass regression leads to biased estimates 
of contagion. Another issue is the fact that the coefficients estimated with Equation 
(2) do not show a change in the impact of the systematic component rworld,i. Thus, the 
model given in Equations (1) and (2) provides changes in the co-movement of the 
filtered or idiosyncratic shocks. 
In order to alleviate the first-pass regression sensitivity to “unexpected” 
shocks and test world and domestic contagion, we apply the following model:  
 
(3)
 
where rfin.,world,t is the return of the global financial sector portfolio, while the sub-
script S denotes the sector under examination for each market. The model is also 
used to analyze contagion across aggregate stock market indices. In this case S 
represents the sum of all sectors and is substituted by market. We assume that the 
GFC was triggered by a crisis in the financial sector. This model estimates a change 
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in the transmission mechanism of systematic shocks in a crisis period compared to a 
non-crisis period. The dummy variable Dcrisis is equal to unity if there is a crisis and 
zero otherwise. If the coefficient estimate of b2 is positive and statistically different 
from zero, there is evidence of contagion. This type of contagion can be termed “sys-
tematic contagion” in contrast to “idiosyncratic contagion” as estimated by Equations 
(1) and (2). The model is estimated within an asymmetric GARCH (1,1) framework 
of Lawrence R. Glosten, Ravi Jagannathan, and David E. Runkle (1993), since equity 
returns exhibit conditional heteroskedasticity.  
In order to specify the length of the GFC, we define a relatively long crisis pe-
riod which includes all major financial and economic news events representing the 
GFC, i.e. the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (15
th September 2008). To obtain a 
relative long period of crisis we use timelines provided by official sources, such as 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2009) and the Bank for International Settle-
ments - BIS (2009), which separate the crisis period in four phases. Phase 1 is de-
scribed as “initial financial turmoil” and spans from 1
st August 2007 to 15
th Septem-
ber 2008. Phase 2 is defined as “sharp financial market deterioration” (16
th Septem-
ber 2008 until 31
st December 2008), phase 3 is described as “macroeconomic dete-
rioration” (1
st January 2009 until 31
st March 2009) and phase 4 as “stabilization and 
tentative signs of recovery” (from 1
st April onwards to the end of our sample). Ac-
cording to above crisis specification, we use a crisis period that spans from 1
st Au-
gust 2007 until 31
st March 2009.  
This length of the crisis period has been used by several studies so far (see: 
Dooley and Hutchison 2009; Bekaert et al. 2011). However, all studies on contagion, 
which determine the crisis length either ad-hoc based on major economic and finan-
cial events (Forbes and Rigobon 2002) or endogenously (Boyer, Kumagai, and Yuan 
2006), are to some degree arbitrary, because they all depend on a correct definition of 
the crisis period. As Baur (2012, p. 2682) argues, “…even studies that avoid discre-
tion in the definition of the crisis period use discretion in the choice of the econome-
tric model to estimate the location of the crisis period in time”. 
Then we test four alternative channels of contagion: aggregate stock market 
contagion, financial sector contagion and real economy (non-financial sector) conta-
gion spread through the global financial system or the domestic financial system. To 
differentiate between global and domestic contagion, Equation (3) is augmented as 
follows: 
 
, , 1 . ,, 2 . ,, , 1 . , ,
2. , , , , ,          + .
  

S i t fin world t fin world t crisis t fin i t
fin i t crisis t S i t
ra b r b r D c r
cr D e
  (4)
 
The equation can be used to estimate changes in the return co-movement of a 
specific sector S with the global financial system (rfin.,world) or with the domes-
tic/regional financial system (rfin.,i). Following the testing framework of Baur (2012), 
the tests and hypotheses are given below.  
Test 1 - Aggregate equity market contagion: An increased co-movement of 
a stock market index i  and world stock index in crisis period compared to stable 
period. This test empirically investigates the aggregate equity market index conta-
gion across markets (i = US, developed Europe), and assumes that the source of con-
tagion is the world stock market index.  
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Test 2 - Global financial sector contagion: An increased co-movement of a 
financial sector stock index i  and world financial sector stock index in crisis period 
compared to stable period. This test investigates contagion of the US and developed 
European financial sectors from the world financial sector.  
Test 3 - Financial contagion of real economy sector on a global level: An 
increased co-movement of a non-financial sector stock index i and world financial 
sector index in crisis period compared to stable period. This test investigates conta-
gion of the US and developed European non-financial sectors from the world finan-
cial sector.  
Test 4 - Financial contagion of real economy sector on a domestic level: 
An increased co-movement of a non-financial sector stock index i and domestic fi-
nancial sector stock index in crisis period compared to stable period. This test ex-
amines contagion across sectors within US and developed European region and can 
be used as a local or domestic test of contagion. It assumes that the financial sector of 
a region is infected by the GFC and spreads it to other non-financial sectors.  
The null hypothesis ( 0 H ) and alternative hypothesis ( 1 H ) for Tests 1-3 are the 
following:  
02
12
: 0 (no evidence of contagion)
: 0 (evidence of contagion).


Hb
Hb
 
   
The null and alternative hypotheses for Test 4 are given by: 
 
02
12
: 0 (no evidence of contagion)
: 0 (evidence of contagion).


Hc
Hc
 
  
Furthermore the above framework allows an analysis of the homogeneity of 
the contagion effects across markets and sectors. If the propagation of shocks is ho-
mogeneous, investors act similarly (e.g., sell stocks simultaneously due either to 
margin calls or to panic preferring safer assets), and there is investors-induced conta-
gion. In contrast, when investors observe a change in fundamentals (e.g., firms’ 
higher cost of capital due to more risk-averse banks and investors) and act according-
ly, there is fundamental-induced contagion. In this study, we assume that investor-
induced contagion leads to a relatively homogeneous change in the level of co-
movement across markets and sectors, whereas fundamentals-based contagion is ex-
pected to lead to a more heterogeneous form of contagion. 
 
3. Data and Preliminary Analysis 
 
The data comprises daily MSCI aggregate stock indices of World, US, developed 
Europe and ten sector stock indices of the geographical areas of US and developed 
Europe (Financial, Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Ser-
vices, Healthcare, Information Technology, Telecommunications and Utilities). All 
MSCI stock indices are denominated in USD (the results using indices denominated 
on domestic currency are similar and available upon request). The developed Euro-
pean region includes the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,  
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France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. The data extracted from Thomson Finan-
cial (Datastream) covers the period from 1
st January 2004 to 31
st December 2009, 
giving a total of 1825 observations. For each MSCI index, the continuously com-
pounded return was estimated as rt = 100[log(pt) – log(pt-1)], where pt is the price on 
day t. 
Summary statistics for US and developed European aggregate stock indices’ 
returns are displayed in Table 1. Panel A reports summary statistics for the full sam-
ple period and show significant differences in mean returns, standard deviations, 
skewness, kurtosis and autocorrelation (Ljung-Box statistics) across the two aggre-
gate market indices. Panel B presents the summary statistics for the crisis period 
identified using key economic and financial events of the GFC as described in me-
thodology framework section. Comparing the two periods, we can perceive that all 
stock returns show significant changes in mean returns, standard deviations, skew-
ness and kurtosis.  
 
Table 1   Descriptive Statistics for Aggregate Stock Market Indices 
 
Panel A: Full sample period (2004-2009) 
   Mean  Std. dev.  Min.  Max.  Skewness  Kurtosis  N  J-Berra  Ljung Box  p-value 
Dev. Europe  0.0086  1.2694  -7.9177  9.5723  -0.1000  11.7422  1825  5824.499  36.693  0.000 
US 0.0048  1.4196  -9.1461  10.448  -0.1400  11.2946  1825   5248.141  93.167  0.000 
Panel B: Crisis period (2007-2009)       
Dev.  Europe  -0.1762 2.0247 -7.9177  9.5724  0.1371  6.7274  434    252.6007  29.252  0.004 
US  -0.1306 2.3582 -9.1461  10.4484 0.0519  5.8991  434    152.1809  39.300  0.000 
 
Note: The table presents descriptive statistics of the daily aggregate stock market returns for US and developed Europe 
during stable and crisis periods. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of World, US, World Financial and Devel-
oped European stock indices over time. The figure shows strong co-movement 
among all equity market indices and significant declines in the levels during 2008, 
especially at the time of Lehman Brothers collapse (15
th September 2008). Since all 
equity returns exhibit ARCH and asymmetric effects (results not presented here), the 
asymmetric GARCH process (GJR-GARCH) adopted in this paper is an appropriate 
specification.  
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Figure 1  Equity Market Indices Behavior over Time 
 
4. Empirical Results and Robustness Tests 
 
This section presents the estimation results of the econometric model specified in 
Equations (3) and (4) and discusses the implications for the hypotheses presented in 
Section 2. Tables 2 and 3 present the results for the 4 tests of contagion. Not surpri-
singly, Table 2 - Panel A indicates that both aggregate equity indices are integrated 
with world equity market, since they have positive and statistically significant (b1) 
coefficient. The equity markets of US and developed Europe are among the largest in 
terms of capitalization and their large interdependence with the world equity index is 
an expected outcome. Moreover, they indicate evidence of contagion since (b2) coef-
ficients are positive and statistically significant. It is interesting to mention that both 
stock indices show evidence of contagion, although US was the source of the GFC. 
This could be explained by the strong financial and economic ties among these two 
geographical areas. These findings are in line with the individual stock market analy-
sis’ results of Baur (2012). The results also show that the coefficient governing con-
tagion (b2) varies significantly across the two areas. This heterogeneity of the conta-
gion effect suggests a fundamentals-based contagion. This type of contagion occurs 
when investors observe a change in fundamentals and act accordingly.  
Panel B of Table 2 presents the results of global financial sector contagion. 
The interdependence of both financial sector indices with the world financial index is 
present, while contagion effects exist only among US and the world financial sector. 
The contagion coefficient (b2) is negative and statistically insignificant for the devel-
oped European financial index, suggesting the immunity of the European financial 
sector from the world financial sector. This finding is not in line with the results of 
Baur (2012), who provides evidence on contagion for all European countries’ finan-
cial sectors included in his sample. According to Bekaert et al. (2011), the explana-
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tion of this finding could be that developed markets with great exposure via trade or 
financial linkages were not necessarily hit hardest by the financial crisis, mainly due 
to their fundamental strengths and quality of financial institutions. However, the fact 
that there is no evidence of contagion in the European financial sector does not mean 
that some of the financial sectors of the countries were not affected by the crisis. The 
findings merely imply that the regional financial sector index did not suffer from an 
increased co-movement with a falling portfolio of world financial stocks. Further 
analysis of the decreasing co-movement of the European financial sector index with 
the world financial portfolio shows that the co-movement with the world portfolio of 
financial stocks decreased because the value of the world financial index deteriorated 
by more than the regional financial stock portfolio in that period. 
   
Table 2   Contagion of US and Developed European Aggregate and Financial Stock Indices -  
 Estimation  Results 
 
Panel A: Aggregate equity market contagion 
 
Model: raggr.,i,t = a + b1raggr.,world,t + b2 raggr., world, t Dcrisis,t + eaggr.,i,t  
  a b1 b 2  Contagion 
Dev. Europe  0.0244**  0.8494***  0.0865***  C 
US -0.0180  1.1256***  0.0459*  C 
 
Panel B: Global financial sector contagion 
 
Model: rfin.,i,t = a + b1 rfin.,world,t + b2 rfin.,i,t Dcrisis,t + efin.,i,t 
Dev. Europe  5.38E-06  0.9765***  -0.0068  - 
US -0.0034  0.6434***  0.4280***  C 
 
Notes: C denotes contagion during the crisis period if the dummy coefficient b2 is positive and statistically significant; - 
denotes no evidence of contagion; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respective-
ly.  
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
Table 3 displays the results associated with Hypotheses 3 and 4, thus testing 
the existence of contagion among the world financial sector/domestic financial sector 
and the sectors representing the real economy in each area. For Test 3, we assume 
that the global financial system has a direct impact on US and developed Europe 
non-financial firms. This is because firms are directly affected by the GFC since lend 
and borrow globally. In order to control for an increased co-movement of the finan-
cial sector with the domestic financial sector, we use Equation (4) which includes the 
domestic financial sector returns in normal and crisis periods as control variables. All 
US real economy sectors are infected by the GFC, since the coefficients b2 are posi-
tive and statistically significant. On the other hand, developed European sectors ex-
hibit no evidence of contagion, except two sectors: Consumer Services and Health-
care. Almost the same findings are provided by Baur (2012) for the US sectors and 
the two infected European sectors. Since all other sectors in this region seem to be 
immune, this suggests that they are prone to portfolio diversification. These results 
demonstrate that US firms are more exposed to the global financial system than de-
veloped European firms. Panel B contains the coefficient estimates measuring the 
crisis specific change in the level of co-movement of the “local” financial stock in-
dex and the non-financial sector indices of the two areas. A positive and statistically 
significant coefficient estimate c2 implies contagion. The results show no cases of 
contagion for all sectors of both regions, supporting the findings of Baur (2012). 
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Table 3   Contagion of US and Developed European Real Economy Sectors - Estimation Results  
 
Model: rS,i,t = a + b1 rfin.,world,t + b2 rfin.,world,t Dcrisis,t + c1 rfin.,i,t + c2 rfin.,i,t Dcrisis,t + eS,i,t 
 
Panel A: Financial contagion of real economy sector on a global level 
  Energy Materials  Industrials 
Cons.  
goods 
Cons.  
services Healthcare Telecom  Info-tech  Utilities 
Dev.  Europe  - - - -  Cg*** Cg*** -  -  - 
US Cg*** Cg*** Cg*** Cg*** Cg*** Cg*** Cg*** Cg*** Cg*** 
Panel B: Financial contagion of real economy sector on a domestic level 
Dev. Europe  -   -   -   -    -   -  -   -   -  
US  -   -   -   -    -   -  -   -   -  
 
Notes: Cg denotes global financial contagion of real economy during the crisis period if the b2 coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant; Cd denotes domestic financial contagion of real economy during the GFC if c2 is positive and statisti-
cally significant; - denotes no evidence of contagion; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
Finally, in order to check the robustness of our results, the sensitivity of the 
crisis period definition and the full period sample is analyzed by three ways as pre-
sented in Table 4 (Panels A, B and C). The main results corresponding to the crisis 
period of 2007-2009 are also presented.  
 
Table 4 Summary of Results and Robustness Tests 
 
  Aggregate equity market 
contagion 
Global financial sector 
contagion 
Global financial contagion 
of real economy sector 
Domestic financial contagion 
of real economy sector 
 
Panel A: Variations of full sample period with fixed crisis start 
Sample 
period:  ‘04-‘09 ‘04-‘10 ‘06-‘09 ‘04-‘09 ‘04-‘10 ‘06-‘09 ‘04-‘09 ‘04-‘10 ‘06-  ‘09 ‘04-‘09 ‘04-‘10 ‘06-‘09 
Dev. Europe  C  C - - - - 2 2 1 0 0 0 
US C  C C C C C 9 9 8 0 0 0 
 
Panel B: Fixed crisis start and variations of the crisis period length 
Crisis period:  Aug. ’07- 
Mar. ‘09 
Aug. ‘07-
Sep. ‘08 
Aug. ‘07-
Dec. ‘08 
Aug. ‘07-
Mar. ‘09 
Aug. ‘07-
Sep. ‘08 
Aug. ‘07- 
Dec. ‘08 
Aug. ‘07-
Mar. ‘09 
Aug. ‘07-
Sep. ‘08 
Aug. ‘07-
Dec. ‘08 
Aug. ‘07-
Mar. ‘09 
Aug. ‘07- 
Sep. ‘08 
Aug. ‘07- 
Dec. ‘08 
Dev. Europe  C  C C - C - 2 2 2 0 1 0 
US  C C C C C C 9 8 9 0 0 0 
Panel C: Fixed crisis period length and variations of the crisis start  
Crisis period:  Aug. ‘07- 
Mar. ‘09 
Sep. ‘08-
Mar. ‘09 
Jan. ‘09-
Mar. ‘09 
Aug. ‘07-
Mar. ‘09 
Sep. ‘08-
Mar. ‘09 
Jan. ‘09- 
Mar. ‘09 
Aug. ‘07-
Mar. ‘09 
Sep. ‘08-
Mar. ‘09 
Jan. ‘09-
Mar. ‘09 
Aug. ‘07-
Mar. ‘09 
Sep. ‘08- 
Mar. ‘09 
Jan. ‘09- 
Mar. ‘09 
Dev. Europe  C  C C - - - 2 2 1 1 1 0 
US C  C C C C C 9 9 9 0 0 0 
 
Notes: This table summarizes the test results of different types of contagion during the crisis period (August 2007-March 
2009), while presents the robustness tests’ results by varying the full sample period, the crisis period length and the crisis 
starting date; C denotes contagion and the numbers in Panels A, B and C display the number of real economy sectors 
affected by the crisis; - denotes no evidence of contagion. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
Firstly, we change the sample period into two different horizons: (1) 2004-
2010 (the sample extended beyond 2009 and spans until the end of 2010) and (2) 
2006-2009 (the sample starts from 2006), while the crisis period remains the same, 
i.e. 2007-2009 for all cases. The results from the GJR-GARCH model presented in 
Panel A are almost similar with those of the period 2004-2009. Secondly, we fix the 
crisis start date at August 2007 and the length of the crisis is increasing until: (i) 15
th 
September 2008 (the collapse of Lehman Brothers) and (ii) 31
st December 2008 (end  
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of phase 2 - “initial financial turmoil” according to the official timelines). The coeffi-
cients indicating contagion change only slightly. Thirdly, we fix the crisis length (un-
til end of March 2009) and the crisis starts at: (a) 15
th September 2008 and (b) 1
st 
January 2009 (the beginning of phase 3 - “macroeconomic deterioration” according 
to the official timelines). Again, the results of this sensitivity analysis are almost the 
same. Overall, these results indicate that changes due to sample period selection and 
crisis period definition are rather small and economically insignificant. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper empirically investigates the contagion effects of the GFC from the finan-
cial sector to real economy using an asymmetric GJR-GARCH (1,1) model and a 
dataset of aggregate and sector stock indices of US and developed Europe during the 
period 2004-2009. We test for contagion across stock markets on the aggregate level 
and the sector level, on the global level and the domestic/regional level. Results im-
ply that the contagion hypothesis holds for US and developed European aggregate 
stock markets, while financial sector contagion is evident only for US financial sec-
tor stocks. 
In line with Baur (2012), the evidence for contagion of the sectors 
representing the real economy is mixed. Specifically, contagion effects from the 
global financial portfolio are present for all US real economy sectors, implying the 
diminished benefits of international portfolio diversification. On the other hand, the 
developed European region exhibit evidence of contagion only for Consumers Ser-
vices and Healthcare sectors. Moreover, our results show no evidence of domestic 
financial contagion of real economy sectors for both geographical areas. 
Our findings have important implications for investors, policy makers and in-
ternational organizations, such as International Monetary Fund (IMF), with regard to 
the linkages among the markets and their real economy sectors during the GFC. In 
particular, investors may benefit from the different vulnerability of the markets and 
real economy sectors, since holding a portfolio with equities from diverse sectors is 
less subject to systematic risk. From policymakers and international organizations’ 
perspective, this study provides useful information about the directions for possible 
future policy decisions in order to protect countries and investors from future finan-
cial crises. Future research may investigate the dynamics of contagion across differ-
ent phases of the GFC. 
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